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TRIPS AFTER FIFTEEN YEARS
I. INTRODUCTION
Has it been successful? Or, has it been a failure, ready to be put out to
pasture? These are the questions that surround the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).1 TRIPS was a
landmark event. It has been hailed as "the most far reaching and
comprehensive legal regime ever concluded at the multinational level in the area
of intellectual property rights . . . " and "unquestionably the most important
development in international intellectual property law [in the last century]." 2
Yet, only fifteen years since its adoption, some are questioning its vitality. In
some quarters, TRIPS was outdated the moment it was signed. While
addressing-for the first time under one international IP scheme-seven
different areas of intellectual property, it did not include provisions related to
digital technology. This was left for other international intellectual property
treaties. Moreover, even regarding the areas TRIPS covers, the purported
major gains achieved by its adoption have been questioned. For some, TRIPS'
time has come and gone. For others, the picture is not clear, and it may require
more time to accurately assess its impact on international intellectual property
policymaking.
Nevertheless, after fifteen years, it is appropriate to evaluate whether TRIPS
has been successful and to evaluate its impact on the development of global
intellectual property standards. This Article attempts to do so. The Article
proceeds as follows. Part II will ask whether TRIPS is relevant. This is an
important question. If TRIPS has lost its relevance in international intellectual
property after only fifteen years, its demise is likely assured. After having
moved to the top of the hierarchical structure in international intellectual
property lawmaking, its rapid descent and the strategic behavior of states
seeking to change IP norms in alternative fora to undermine TRIPS suggest that
TRIPS will not be able to recapture its lost glory (if indeed it had any). Part III
1 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal
Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter TRIPS]. Ralph Oman, Intellectual Property After the Uruguay Round, 42 J. COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. 18, 18 (1994).
2 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, at xvii
(Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1st ed. 1998); Charles R. McManis, Intellectual
Property and International Mergers and Acquiiions, 66 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1286 (1998). TRIPS is
considered by many to be a major accomplishment in the effort to harmonize patent laws
throughout the world. Martin J. Adelman, Prospects and Limits of the Patent Provision in the TRIPS
Agreement. The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 507, 512 (1996) ("The importance of
TRIPS cannot be easily overemphasized.").
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evaluates whether TRIPS has been successful. This is not an easy task. Most
importantly, how should one define success? In this Part, a number of different
measures to judge success are identified and critiqued. Ultimately, the
definition of success turns on how much of an impact the treaty has had in
changing the global intellectual property lawmaking regime. Under that
standard, the most salient provision to assess and evaluate TRIPS might be
TRIPS' compulsory licensing provision. Part IV does this. Using compulsory
licensing as a window to TRIPS' success yields mixed results. In some ways,
the compulsory licensing story has been remarkable. WTO Members came
together to amend TRIPS-no small feat. Yet, the provision rarely has been
used. How should one view this? The final part analyzes the results from the
compulsory licensing question and makes some concluding remarks for future
consideration.
II. Is TRIPS RELEVANT?
Before addressing whether TRIPS has been successful, a necessary threshold
inquiry is whether TRIPS is still relevant. While TRIPS' relevance is tangentially
related to its past success, it is directly related to TRIPS' future success. In
particular, whether TRIPS is relevant will impact whether the international
community should further concern itself with TRIPS so that TRIPS can
accomplish those goals it set out to accomplish.
A number of recent developments demonstrate that states are strategically
seeking "to propose norms in alternative fora specifically to undermine, if not
upend, TRIPS obligations." 3 That major IP battles are being fought in other
fora-intentionally outside of the WTO-raises serious concerns for TRIPS,
and for IP development in general. Graeme Dinwoodie and Rochelle Dreyfuss
make this point: "In recent years, it has become clear that the TRIPS regime is
in trouble. Although lawmaking in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has
essentially stalled, there is a continuing need to recalibrate the rules applicable to
knowledge production."4
For Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, TRIPS' significance in international
intellectual property lawmaking is decreasing, in part because TRIPS has not
been amenable to changes necessary to address newly emerging technology or
trends. These scholars are not alone in their view. There are a number of
3 Ruth Okediji, WIPO-WTO Relations and the Future of Global Intellectual Property Norms,
NETHERLANDS YEARBOOK OF INT'L L. 39 (I.F. Dekker & P.A. Nollkaemper eds., 2008).
4 Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a Global Intellectual Properly System
Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO and Beyond, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1187, 1188 (2009).
370 [Vol. 18:367
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indicators that support these scholars' view that TRIPS' influence and
importance may be waning. These include: (1) the various newly-negotiated
intellectual property agreements covering areas excluded from or outside of
TRIPS; (2) the numerous free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded by the
United States and the European Union with other countries (which FTAs
frequently require TRIPS-plus standards); (3) the United States' threats of
unilateral trade retaliation, which TRIPS was thought to supersede; and (4) the
perceived limited use and impact of the WTO dispute settlement system to
resolve TRIPS-related disputes.
A. INDICATIONS OF IRRELEVANCE
1. Emerging Technologies, Special Subject Matter, and Regime Shifting.
a. WIPO Copyrght Treaties. Before the ink was dry on the TRIPS
Agreement, it was outdated. TRIPS did not deal with the "digital agenda"-the
problems raised by digital technology and particularly the Internet. As such,
only two years after TRIPS was adopted, the World Intellectual Property
Organization (WIPO), rather than the WTO, adopted the WIPO Copyright
Treaty (WCT)5 to clarify existing norms related to digital technology and, where
necessary, to create new norms to respond to the challenges created by this new
technology. At precisely the same time (at the same Diplomatic Conference),
WIPO adopted the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). 6 As
with the WCT, the WPPT addressed issues in the digital environment with
particular concern for performances and phonograms. The WPPT provided
for rights for the storage and transmission of works in digital form. As seen
then, TRIPS-heralded as the most important development in intellectual
property in the last century-was certainly not the last word in international
intellectual property matters, and was barely two years old before it was
superseded in matters relating to the new digital environment.
b. Traditional Knowledge, Folklore, and Genetic Resources. TRIPS also excluded
from its coverage other forms of intellectual property that fell outside of the
traditional Western-style forms of intellectual property (e.g., patents, copyrights,
trademarks, trade secrets, etc.). Such lesser regarded knowledge products, such
as traditional knowledge, folklore, and genetic resources, represented intellectual
property important and indigenous to developing countries. As a result,
protection for these IP goods has been pursued outside of TRIPS.
s WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997)
[hereinafter WCT].
6 WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 105-17, 36
I.L.M. 76 (1997) [hereinafter WPPT].
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The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is one example.7 Under the
umbrella of WIPO, the CBD covers the preservation of the diversity of generic
resources found in nature, including those resources found in animals and
plants. The CBD provides rules recognizing state ownership and control over
genetic resources located within the state's territorial boundaries. Importantly,
the relationship between the CBD and TRIPS has been the subject of
considerable controversy since TRIPS was adopted. The TRIPS Council was
instructed "to examine, inter alia, the relationship between the TRIPS
Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity, the protection of
traditional knowledge and folklore, and other relevant new developments raised
by members . . . ."8 In the last decade, it has become increasingly clear that
TRIPS' relationship to the CBD is attenuated, at best. Once again, it is WIPO
that has made significant progress in efforts to develop an international legal
instrument for the protection of traditional knowledge, traditional cultural
expression, and genetic resources-all outside of TRIPS.9
2. Special 301. Special 301 of the United States trade legislation is another
area that arguably demonstrates that TRIPS has been ineffective or has had
limited relevance. That section provides a mechanism that allows for a possible
retaliatory trade action against countries providing inadequate protection for
United States' intellectual property rights.'0 The provision requires the Office
of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to prepare a report
concerning foreign countries' intellectual property-related practices. The
"Special 301" Report is an annual review of the state of global intellectual
property rights protection and enforcement."
7 Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992) [hereinafter CBD].
8 See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002) 19 [hereinafter Doha Declaration]; see also
Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round's Public Health Legay: Strategies for the
Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended TRIPS Provisions, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L.
90 (2007).
9 Daniel Pruzin, Intellectual Property. WIPO Advances on Global Legal Instrument to Protect Traditional
Knowledge, Folklore, B.N.A. INT'L TRADE REP., Aug. 19, 2010, 27 ITR 1254. There is still much
more to be done, and developing countries, led by many African countries, seek a binding legal
instrument, such as a new treaty, while the United States has suggested nonbinding global
guidelines, or a similar legal instrument.
10 Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2010 Special 301 Report, Annex 1 (2010),
available athttp://www.ustr.gov/web/frmsend/1906 [hereinafter Special 301 Report].
"' The Development topics each year cover: Initiatives to Strengthen IPR Internationally,
Trends in Counterfeiting, Internet and Digital Piracy, Government Use of Software, Intellectual
Property and Health Policy, Supporting Pharmaceutical Innovation, Implementation of the WTO
TRIPS Agreement, WTO Dispute Settlement, and Positive Developments.
372 [Vol. 18:367
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Countries that have been identified as being the most egregious violators of
United States' intellectual property rights are placed on a "Priority Watch List."
Annex I to the 2010 report describes this priority status: "Countries that have
the most onerous or egregious acts, policies, or practices and whose acts,
policies, or practices have the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on
the relevant United States' products must be designated as 'Priority Foreign
Countries.' "12 Countries on the Priority Watch List become the focus of
unilateral attention by the United States.' 3
Special 301 is germane to this discussion because, in the build up to TRIPS,
countries which were the subjects of retaliation under Special 301 believed that
adopting TRIPS would shield them from further United States unilateral action,
and that the United States instead would commit to the WTO multilateral
process for redress of alleged IP rights violations.14 Despite this, the United
States has continued to use the Special 301 procedure.' 5 Some have argued that
this is due to certain setbacks in the international expansion of intellectual
property, such as through TRIPS.16 In any event, United States enforcement
efforts have shifted away from WTO dispute settlement and towards a return to
unilateral action via Special 301, possibly signaling TRIPS' declining
importance.' 7
12 Special 301 Report, supra note 10.
13 The 2010 Priority Watch List, for example, includes: Algeria, Argentina, Canada, Chile,
China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Russia, Thailand, and Venezuela. A secondary list, the "watch
list," includes countries who are developing their intellectual property policies, countries with
whom the U.S. is working to protect specific U.S. industries (example: pharmaceutical protection
in Finland in 2010), countries who are trying but not complying with previous agreements, and
whose impact on U.S. industries is less than the impact of the "priority" list countries (for
example, in 2009, the U.S. lists many of the same issues with Lebanon as with China).
14 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, The Dog that Barked but Didn't Bite: 15 Years of Intellectual Property
Disputes at the WTO, 1(2) J. INT'L Disp. SETTLEMENT 389, 389 (2010) ("[TRIPS] embodied a trade-
off between the United States and other WTO members (especially developing countries)
whereby the United States agreed to stop unilaterally enforcing United States IP rights backed-up
by unilateral trade sanctions under what is known as 'Special 301', in exchange for multilaterally
controlled and enforced IP standards made binding on all WTO members.... [T]his has not
meant the end of 'Special 301'. It is still used as a preliminary procedure that may result in
triggering a TRIPS case before the WTO as well as to address IP issues not regulated in TRIPS
(and therefore not subject to Article 23 of the DSU).").
'5 Id
16 Id. at 392.
17 Id. at 429 ("Mhe political victory of IP skeptics at Doha led many IP proponents to shift
attention, tail-between-legs, away from the WTO and toward unilateral enforcement (in the
United States, under 'Special 301) and, especially, preferential trade agreements where so-called
TRIPS-plus commitments were sought and obtained.").
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3. Bilateral Treaties. In tandem with its renewed reliance on Special 301, the
United States (and the European Union) has sought to include TRIPS-plus
commitments in its recent free trade agreements (FTAs), which it could not
have achieved within the WTO.' 8 In many ways, this represents a stronger
signal that TRIPS has been supplanted with respect to current intellectual
property matters.'9 The intellectual property provisions negotiated in bilateral
agreements between developed countries, such as the United States and the
European Union, and developing countries, including least-developed
countries, restrict TRIPS' flexibilities and, moreover, demand more stringent
TRIPS-plus commitments, such as increased data protection and restricted use
of compulsory licensing. 20
The United States and European Union free trade agreements are
considered in greater detail below in regard to compulsory licensing. Here,
however, the main point is that, by taking advantage of the asymmetry in
economic power, both the United States and the European Union have
increased the pace of such agreements being concluded in the post-TRIPS
period, and, by leveraging such agreements, they have undermined TRIPS,
ultimately "ratcheting up" IP protection beyond what TRIPS requires. 21
4. ACTA. The most recent shift of intellectual property matters away from
TRIPS concerns increased enforcement efforts, as addressed by the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). 22  ACTA provides detailed
provisions for enforcing intellectual property rights.23  It contains four
substantive sections related to introducing global standards for (1) civil
enforcement (making clear that injunctions are available for infringing conduct);
(2) border measures (providing for "effective border enforcement of intellectual
property rights"); (3) criminal enforcement (applying criminal procedures and
penalties for at least cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright
infringement, and providing for seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of
counterfeit goods); and (4) enforcement of intellectual property rights in the
18 Jean-Frederick Morin, Multilateralising TRIPS-plus Agreements: Is the US Stratege a Failure?, 12 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175 (2009).
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 See PETER DRAHOs, EXPANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY's EMPIRE: THE ROLE OF FTAS
(2003), http://www.ictsd.net/downloads/2008/08/drahos-fta-2003-en.pdf; see also Morin, supra
note 18.
22 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, Dec. 3, 2010, opened for signature May 1, 2010, available
at http://www.ustr.gov/webfmsebd.2416 [hereinafter ACTA]; Morin, supra note 18.
23 Morin, supra note 18.
[Vol. 18:367374
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digital environment (targeting trademark and copyright infringement on the
Internet).24
There are many criticisms leveled against ACTA.25 Most pertinent here is
the concern that ACTA is an attempt to bypass TRIPS to "create not an
agreement between several countries, but a global standard on copyright
infringement, without going through any true multilateral process." 26 Indeed,
Victoria A. Espinel, the U.S. Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator
(the U.S. Intellectual Property Czar) has claimed that TRIPS is "outdated," thus
requiring the new intellectual property enforcement treaty.27
To be sure, the above evidence could, as Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss claim,
demonstrate that "[c]ountries are showing signs of giving up on the WTO."28
The above examples support such a conclusion. Nonetheless, there are
contrary indicators signaling that TRIPS remains relevant.29 Most notable of
these are (1) Members' continued implementation of TRIPS obligations, (2) the
continued use of the WTO dispute settlement system to resolve TRIPS-related
disputes, and (3) compliance with recent adverse TRIPS' decisions.
B. INDICATIONS OF RELEVANCE
1. Countries Still Implementing TRIPS Provisions. There is no doubt that
countries are continuing to enact implementing legislation to comply with their
TRIPS obligations. Within the last few months alone, numerous countries have
passed such legislation. The following is a representative list.
a. Montenegro Passes New Trademark Law. Montenegro opened its
Intellectual Property Office on May 28, 2008 and two years later, on November
30, 2010, the Montenegrin Parliament adopted a new trademark law to comply
24 ACTA, supra note 22.
25 See Charles R. McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counteifeiting Trade Agreement (ACIA): Two Tales of
a Treaty, 46 Hous. L. REv. 1235, 1236-37 (2009).
26 Margot Kaminski, The Ongins and Potential Impact of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement
(ACIA), 34 YALE J. INT'L L. 247 (2009); see also Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS
Agreement and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 55-
61 (2004) (stating the criticism that ACTA is an attempt to apply IP maximalism from the top
down); McManis, supra note 25, at 1237 (stating that regime-shifting is not a new phenomenon;
rather the move to the WTO from WIPO was considered a regime shift for developed countries
that no longer believed that WIPO was in their best interests).
27 Nathan Pollard, USTR, Intellectual Property: IP Czar Say ACIA Talks Moved Near Completion in
Tokyo Round, B.N.A. INT'L TRADE REP., Oct. 7, 2010, 27 ITR 1515.
28 Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 1192.
29 Id. at 1223.
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with Montenegro's TRIPS obligations. 30 The law was published in the Official
Gazette of Montenegro No. 72/2010 on December 8, 2010 and entered into
force on December 16, 2010.31 It should be noted that implementing TRIPS-
compliant legislation is crucial for Montenegro's accession to the WTO.32
b. Macedonia Passes New Copyrght Law Criminaliing IP Infringement. On
September 8, 2010, Macedonia passed a new copyright law. The Law on
Copyright and Related Rights harmonized Macedonia's copyright law with
TRIPS and with the European Union acquis as part of its Strategy for
Intellectual Property (2009-2012).33
A significant change is that the new law, in accordance with the
EU Enforcement Directive [and consistent with TRIPS Article
61,] treats copyright infringement as a criminal offence and not as
a misdemeanor. For copyright infringement, the law provides for
a prison sentence of 6 months to 5 years for natural persons, and
a fine for legal entities. 34
c. Sweden Proposes New Trademark Act. Sweden has also passed recent
legislation consistent with its TRIPS obligations. The legislation, which is to
take effect on July 1, 2011, introduces significant new changes to "modernize"
the Trademark Law, which had not been substantially revised since the 1960s. 35
d. Moldova Passes New Copyright Legislation. Finally, Moldova recently
adopted new TRIPS-compliant copyright legislation. The new law on
Copyright and Related Rights, No. 139/2010, entered into force on January 1,
2011.36 It replaced the then-existing Law on Copyright and Related Rights, No.
30 Jasna Jusic Paovic, Montenegro Adopts New Trademark Law, 25 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP.
(BNA) 9 (2010).
31 Id.
32 Id. One of the important provisions of the new law provided that trademarks registered
with the Serbian Intellectual Property Office before May 28, 2008 (the date the Montenegrin
Intellectual Property Office opened) would continue as valid without re-registration or payment
of any additional fees.
33 Zivka Kostovska-Stojkovska, PETOSEVIC, New Macedonian Copynght Law Treats Infingement as
Criminal Offence, http://news.na.com/wiln/WILNWB/splihtdisplay.adp?fedfid=18829636&vnam
e=wiprunotallissues&fn=18829636&jd=18829636&lf=eml&emc=wiln:wiln:108 (last visited Dec.
22, 2010).
3 Id.
35 Axel Calissendorff & Erik Ficks, New Swedish Trademark Act Provides Needed ModerniZation, but
Many Hoped forMore, 25 WORLD INTELL. PROP. REP. (BNA) 27 (2010).
36 Roxanna Saraghi, PETOSEVIc, New Copjright Law Replacing Existing Law Now in Force, available
at http://www.petrosevic.com/resources/news/2010/12/000549 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
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293-XIII, which entered into force on November 23, 1994.37 Significantly, the
law was drafted by the State Agency for Intellectual Property (AGEPI), in
cooperation with European experts, as part of the program Assistance in
Implementing the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) "and the
World Trade Organization (WTO)" to harmonize Moldova's legislation with
international provisions, including TRIPS.38
2. Continued Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System for TRIPS-Related
Disputes. In addition to these indications of relevance, the fact that major WTO
Members-such as the United States and China-are continuing to use the
WTO Dispute Settlement process, and, moreover, continue to comply with
adverse rulings by WTO Panels, is further evidence of the continued vitality of
TRIPS. In 2007, for example, the United States filed two TRIPS-related
complaints against China.39 In both, China was required to amend its laws.
China has done so regarding one complaint40 and is in the process of doing so
regarding the other.41 This is significant, as it signals that the two largest trading
countries in the world respect TRIPS and the dispute settlement process.
Without question, there are signs that TRIPS' importance may be on the
decline. Cries of its death, however, are premature. Accordingly, this Article
proceeds on the assumption that TRIPS is relevant and asks the next
question-has TRIPS been successful? If so, will it continue to be so? If not,
will it eventually be so? The next two sections take up these questions. First,
Part III identifies and responds to various metrics of success. Following that,
Part IV argues that the compulsory licensing provision-though only one
provision in a complex treaty covering multiple intellectual property areas and
related issues-can be used as a window to view TRIPS' success. We then look
at the compulsory licensing provision and its impact to evaluate TRIPS' success.
37 Id.
38 Id
39 Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009); Panel Report, China-MeasuresAffecting Trading Rghts and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Product, WT/DS363/R (Aug. 12, 2009).
40 Panel Report, China-Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
WT/DS362 (Jan. 26, 2009).
41 Current Status, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution Services for Certain
Publications and AudiovisualEntertainment Product, WT/D5363 (Jan. 19, 2010).
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III. DEFINING SUCCESS
A. THE VIEW FROM INTERESTED PARTIES' PRE-TRIPS EXPECTATIONS
Measuring success by comparing TRIPS' impact with interested parties' pre-
TRIPS expectations appears, at first blush, to be the most straightforward
manner of measuring success. At the outset of the TRIPS negotiations,
member states expected that TRIPS could result in a global IP system that
would meet the demands of all member states.42 For advocates of high levels of
intellectual property protection, the expectations were high.43 TRIPS promised
that patentability would extend to nearly all technology fields recognized in
developed patent systems.44 TRIPS would increase the level of international
intellectual property protection, and give more bite to the economic obligations
under the Paris and Berne Conventions. 45 The procedures under TRIPS
entitled private parties to expedient dispute settlement, and provided for
criminal penalties-including fines and imprisonment-to deter counterfeiting
and commercial piracy.46 Moreover, the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU) provided many levels and stages of processes, better ensuring the
successful resolution of disputes.47 With an Appellate Body serving as a review
board for a TRIPS dispute panel, the Agreement at its signing provided an
increased chance that nations would comply with adverse WTO rulings and
could rise above domestic pressures to violate international law.48  The
framework of the DSU also provided a means for establishing a legal
framework through jurisprudence, which in turn was considered to provide
clearer standards and expectations for intellectual property protection than
existed prior to TRIPS.49
42 Id. at 22.
43 Oman, supra note 1, at 30-31; J.H. Reichman, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation:
Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rghts, and International Trade After the GATT's Urmguay Round, 20
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 75, 97 (1993).
4 TRIPS art. 27(1).
45 Oman, supra note 1, at 32. See Paul Edward Geller, Intellectual Propery in the Global
Markeplace: Impact of TRIPS Dispute Settlements?, 29 INT'L L. 99, 106 (1995) (discussing the TRIPS
incorporation of the gaps from the Paris and Berne Conventions).
46 Oman, supra note 1, at 27. TRIPS border control provisions also-were viewed as a legitimate
and promising result of the Agreement. Reichman, supra note 43, at 105-06.
47 Geller, supra note 45, at 114.
48 Id. (explaining how this addresses the concern with the dispute settlement process that
nations are vulnerable to pressures to violate international law to serve their best interests).
49 Id. Yet, there is also a concern that TRIPS panels may never be able adequately to address
larger issues that accompany global intellectual property disputes in the areas of privacy, freedom
of expression, and access to information. Id. at 114-15.
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For less-industrialized countries, TRIPS promised a global IP system that
promoted technological, social, and cultural progress. The WTO also provided
for tradeoffs (linkages) in areas other than intellectual property, namely access
to developed-country markets for textiles and agricultural products. There
were, certainly, concerns about the consequences of increased intellectual
property protection. Would the increased standards result in less discretion or
policy space to advance crucial domestic undertakings? Would the built-in
TRIPS flexibilities have bite? Would they provide the means to access
knowledge, technology, and goods to modernize and industrialize developing-
country economies?
In light of these, at times, competing expectations, one could rationally
compare the post-TRIPS developments and conclude whether TRIPS has or
has not been successful. This will implicate an analysis of WTO/TRIPS
complaints, developments in various countries' domestic intellectual property
laws, and international and domestic intellectual property enforcement efforts.
B. THE VIEW FROM TRIPS OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES
Perhaps a better benchmark for success is the view from TRIPS' objectives
and principles, embodied in Articles 7 and 8. Certainly, if these objectives have
been achieved, we can claim success. The purpose of the TRIPS Agreement,
according to its preamble, was to solve "the need for new rules and disciplines"
by providing, among other things, clearer intellectual property standards in
trade and means for enforcing those standards.50
TRIPS' foremost objective is to liberalize the international trading system
and the "protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights."51 Another
of TRIPS' principal objectives is to eliminate "free-riding" distortions resulting
from the fact that some countries did not protect intellectual property rights. 52
TRIPS' aim is also to "reduce distortions and impediments to international
trade, and to take into account the need to promote effective and adequate
protection of intellectual property rights . . .. "3
50 TRIPS at pmbl. Other purposes included providing clearer standards for how GATT
principles would apply international intellectual property rights, providing procedures to prevent
and resolve international intellectual property disputes, and providing arrangements to allow for
countnes to transition their intellectual property regimes to enable implementation of the TRIPS
agreement.
s1 Id. art. 7 & pmbl.
52 Id. at pmbl.
53 Id. The overarching theme of the TRIPS Agreement was to reduce barriers to trade by
protecting intellectual property rights. TRIPS' title, "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights," and the very first line of its Preamble "to reduce distortions and
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Additionally, the objectives seek to promote the transfer and dissemination
of technology "to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge" and attempt to do so "in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare. . . ."54
TRIPS' "Principles found in Article 8," purport to balance the rights
holders' private rights against the public need to prevent abuses, protect public
health and nutrition, and promote sectors important to a country's socio-
economic and technological development.55 While the attainment of these
objectives and principles would indicate that TRIPS has been successful, it is no
simple matter to determine whether these goals have in fact been met.
C. THE VIEW FROM USE OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
Yet another way to evaluate whether TRIPS has been successful is to look to
WTO complaints filed by WTO members under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Procedure. Joost Pauwelyn takes up this challenge.5 6 From this vantage point,
Pauwelyn describes TRIPS as "the dog that barked but did not bite."57
Pauwelyn reviews "(i) the number and type of TRIPS disputes actually filed and
decided, (ii) institutional and substantive decisions and interpretations reached
by WTO panels and the Appellate Body in their application of the TRIPS
agreement and, finally, (iii) the status of implementation of adverse WTO
rulings under TRIPS,"58 and compares these factors with pre-TRIPS
expectations.
Pauwelyn argues that both the hopes and the fears of the pre-TRIPS
environment were "largely exaggerated."59 His conclusion that TRIPS was
more "bark than bite" rests primarily on the observation that only three
WTO/TRIPS disputes decided during the entire duration of TRIPS "centered
impediments to international trade . . ." reflects its commitment to trade. One of its objectives as
set forth in the Preamble to the WTO Agreement is "the substantial reduction of tariffs and other
barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international trade
relations." Id.
54 TRIPS art. 7 states in full:
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and
dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations.
55 Id. art. 8(1)-(2).
s6 Pauwelyn, supra note 14.
57 Id at 2.
58 Id. at 1.
59 Id at 2.
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on traditional, substantive IP questions (rather than trade discrimination) which
could not have been decided without TRIPS."60 And, as to all of these, none
reached the Appellate Body.61 Thus, TRIPS did not result in the "major boost
in the depth and width of worldwide protection of IP rights," leaving "little or
no room[] for national policy space or social objectives" for developing
countries.62 While his observations and conclusions are noteworthy, Pauwelyn
acknowledges that they say "something about the role and impact of formal
dispute settlement under TRIPS, [and] less about the broader changes brought
about by the TRIPS agreement." 63 As such, it is difficult to rely on this alone to
appraise TRIPS' success.
D. THE VIEW FROM COUNTRIES' COMPLIANCE WITH TRIPS RULINGS
Even if, as Pauwelyn suggests, use of the WTO dispute settlement system
could be used to appraise TRIPS' success, such use would ring hollow if
countries did not abide by WTO rulings. Thus, perhaps the true measure of
success is compliance. Of the twenty-seven WTO cases filed involving TRIPS,
nine were actually decided by a WTO panel and violations were found in
eight.64 Of these, five rulings have been implemented. 65 Pauwelyn notes that
this seventy percent implementation rate is only slightly lower than the eighty
percent overall WTO dispute settlement implementation rate. 66 Many TRIPS
violations require legislative changes, and such changes often are difficult.
"This makes implementation longer and more difficult," and could indicate that
the relatively high implementation rate renders TRIPS successful.67
While all of these-and other-criteria could potentially measure TRIPS
success, 68 none of them are immune from attack. Relying on the interested
parties' expectations, for example, has limitations. As it has played out, TRIPS
has provided something for everyone. What TRIPS offered in increased
60 Id. at 11.
61 See id.
62 Id. at 4.
63 Id. at 2. These changes include "sweeping (and often costly) legislative amendments in many
developing countries, monitoring through the TRIPS Council and bargaining 'in the shadow' of
TRIPS both to weaken and strengthen global IP protection ..... Id.
64 See id. at 6.
65 Id. China recently agreed to implement one ruling not previously included as implemented.
Current Status, supra note 41.
66 Pauwelyn, supra note 14, at 41.
67 Id at 46.
68 Yet another example of how to judge success would be to look to whether countries have
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protection was arguably diluted through the many concessions made to
developing countries. 69 WTO dispute settlement panels issued nuanced and
balanced decisions that, in part, satisfied both sets of expectations. Perhaps the
fact that both sides' expectations were met-even in part-qualifies TRIPS as
successful. For many, however, this criterion for determining success may leave
a lot to be desired.
Relying on TRIPS complaints merely reflects the fact that parties have used
the dispute settlement system. How many complaints must be filed in order for
the system to be considered a success is unclear. Is a high number good-
suggesting that the WTO provides a robust enforcement system? Is a low
number good-suggesting widespread compliance, obviating the need for
enforcement complaints? Neither how WTO panels nor the Appellate Body
ruled signifies success. In other words, the question whether the decisions
strengthened or weakened intellectual property protection is itself contested,
and it is not clear whether strengthening or weakening protection (serving rights
holders' interests or demonstrating the flexibilities in the treaty) would qualify as
successful.
Relying on TRIPS' objectives and principles is similarly fraught with
ambiguity. While Articles 7 and 8 set forth fairly clearly TRIPS objectives and
principles, no WTO panel has yet interpreted these provisions. As such, it is
difficult to ascertain whether post-TRIPS developments are consistent with
these provisions, or whether the TRIPS objectives have been achieved. No
doubt, as Peter Yu concisely states, these two provisions "deserve greater
attention from both the DSB and members participating in the WTO dispute
settlement process," as the two provisions might "provide the key basis for a
pro-development interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement." 70 Whether a pro-
development interpretation is within everyone's definition of success also is
debatable.
This Article adds to the mix by offering still another metric for evaluating
TRIPS' success. The Article links success to TRIPS' impact and to the broader
changes TRIPS has brought to international intellectual property. More
specifically, it is argued here that, if TRIPS' success is to be measured by
looking at its impact, an appropriate metric is the TRIPS provision that has had
(or could have) the most significant impact on the international community and
69 Doris E. Long, Copyright and the Uruguay Round Agreements: A New Era of Protection or an Illusory
Promise, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 531, 577 (1994).
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the international intellectual property regime: TRIPS' compulsory licensing
provision.7'
IV. ANOTHER WINDOW TO VIEW SUCCESS: COMPULSORY LICENSING
A. NEGOTIATING ARTICLE 31
Compulsory licensing was an area of intense negotiations leading up to
TRIPS.72 Developed countries generally sought stronger protection of patented
technologies.73 Developing countries wanted TRIPS to provide easier access to
patented technology, primarily through compulsory licenses. 74  Brazil and
Korea, for example, argued for allowing compulsory licensing, while Austria
and Hong Kong requested more restrictive measures.75' Even after GATT
Director General Dunkel endorsed a draft TRIPS agreement, which served as
the basis for the agreement ultimately adopted, concerns remained regarding
compulsory licenses. 76 The United States was concerned with how TRIPS
would affect the pharmaceutical industry, whereas India had general
reservations about restrictions on compulsory licenses for patents. 77
The compromise resulting from the negotiations was Article 31. That
section, titled "Other Use Without Authorization of the Right Holder," gives
countries broad discretion on, inter alia, government use of compulsory
71 While the thrust of this Article suggests that the compulsory licensing provision has been
expansively interpreted or amended expansively, allowing countries-primarily developing
countries-greater flexibility and discretion in using the provision to address public health
concerns, concededly "it is notoriously difficult to assess whether a treaty has been expansively or
restrictively interpreted." Pauwelyn, supra note 14, at 15. Moreover, relying on one provision in a
treaty to define success also has its limitations, as will be discussed later.
72 A compulsory license is a state-granted license issued to a third party to manufacture and
produce a patented invention without the patent owner's consent. Paul Gorecki, Regulating the
Price of Prescrition Drugs in Canada: Compulsory Licensing, Pmduct Selection, and Government
Reimbursement Programmes, TECHNICAL REP. SER. (1981) (defining a compulsory license as "an
involuntary contract between a willing buyer and an unwilling seller imposed and enforced by the
state").
73 DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 15 (1st ed.
1998).
74 Id. at 16.
7s Id Specifically, Austria and Hong Kong proposed means for judicial review, a limitation of
licensed products to domestic markets, non-exclusivity of licenses, and appropriate compensation
to rights owners.
76 See id. at 26-27 (describing the continuing disagreements among member states in the
negotiating rounds regarding compulsory licenses).
77 Id. at 27.
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licensing.78 However, the grounds are not unlimited; TRIPS contains numerous
conditions that must be met before the government can authorize licenses.
Three of the main conditions are that, as a general rule: (1) an effort should be
made to negotiate a voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms;79 (2) the
government must provide for "adequate remuneration" to the right holder;8
and (3) the license use must be "predominantly for the supply of the domestic
market."8
B. THE DOHA DECLARATION
While negotiations surrounding the TRIPS compulsory licensing provision
were contentious, compulsory licensing in action took center stage in 2001, when
South Africa attempted to reduce drug costs and address its overwhelming
AIDS pandemic by enacting the South African Medicines and Related
Substances Control Amendment Act of 1997 (the Act). The Act allowed local
manufacturers to make AIDS drugs (compulsory licensing) or import them
from neighboring countries that produced them less expensively than the patent
owners (parallel importation). The Act sought to ensure the supply of drugs at
affordable prices, thus allowing victims to get the drugs much less expensively
than they would be able to otherwise.
In response to the Act, the patent owners of the HIV/AIDS drugs-
primarily European and United States pharmaceutical companies--objected,
arguing that the Act violated international patent laws, including TRIPS.
According to these parties, the Act violated TRIPS because it allowed the South
7 TRIPS art. 31. Arguably, countries also might justify compulsory licenses based on a public-
interest exception (Article 8(1)), or as a means to prevent abuses by intellectual property rights
holders (Article 8(2)). Compulsory licenses based on these principles still must be consistent with
Article 31.
79 This requirement may be waived in case of "national emergency," "other circumstances of
extreme urgency," or "in cases of public non-commercial use." Id. This exception allows a
government to bypass the step of negotiating compensation with the patent holder in the
interests of expediency. In 2002, Zimbabwe invoked this exception to override patents on
antiretroviral drugs in response to the AIDS crisis gripping the country. Press Release, Doctors
Without Borders, Zimbabwe Government Takes Emergeny Action Against HIV/AIDS (May 29, 2002),
available at http://www.msfarcess.org/media-room/press-release-detail/index.html%3ftxttnews
[tt.news]=92&cHash=cfDb848ads.
80 TRIPS art. 31.
s1 As mentioned throughout, there are many exceptions to the general rules, including non-
commercial use. Other conditions include: (1) the scope and duration of the license must be
limited to the purpose of the authorization; (2) the license is non-exclusive and is generally non-
transferable; (3) the license is terminated when "the circumstances which led to it cease to exist
and are unlikely to recur;" and (4) the government's decision is subject to independent judicial
review. Id. art. 31(c), (0, (k), (1).
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African health minister to act unilaterally without first having to prove a drug
manufacturer abused its patent, and allowed local manufacturers to make the
drugs without first seeking the patent owner's permission-both of which
TRIPS requires.82
Although the pharmaceutical companies eventually dismissed the suit, the
suit did highlight the likelihood that patents and monopoly pricing would keep
essential medicines out of the reach of millions of HIV/AIDS victims.83 This
"growing crisis" led WTO members to meet in Doha, Qatar to engage in more
negotiations to address the issue.84
In an effort to improve access to essential medicines, the WTO Ministerial
Conference adopted the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health in November 2001.85
82 The Act also makes no provision for compensating the patent-holder. In all, thirty-nine
drug companies sued South Africa. Despite South Africa's assurances that it only planned to use
the Act in the spirit of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) patent rules, which allow
intellectual property rights to be overridden in exceptional circumstances, the companies argued
that the Act allowed South Africa to override patents at will. Pharmaceuticals Drop Lawsuit to Stop
South Africa From Importing Generic AIDS Drugs, BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, Apr. 20, 2001
[hereinafter BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER]. Concurrent with the lawsuit, the United States placed
South Africa on its "Section 301 Watch List." Section 301 retaliatory actions include withdrawing
benefits the foreign country enjoys because of a trade agreement with the United States, entering
into new agreements to eliminate the offending action, or imposing duties or other import
restrictions against goods or an economic sector of the foreign country. These actions may be
taken irrespective of any breach of an international agreement, such as TRIPS. McDorman, supra
note 76, at 90. The United States then imposed sanctions against South African goods, and,
further, went to the WTO to try to enforce U.S. patent rights. Marcus Mabry, Give Us This Day
Our Daily Meds, NEWSWEEK, July 5, 1999, available at http://www.newsweek.com/1999/07/04/gi
ve-us-this-day-our-daily-meds.html. The pharmaceutical industry also closed factories in South
Africa and canceled numerous investments. BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, supra note 82.
83 In April 2001, the pharmaceutical companies acquiesced and dismissed the suit. They
agreed that the Act could be enforced as written, and said that they would pay the government's
legal costs. BULLETIN'S FRONTRUNNER, supra note 82. Pharmaceutical companies agreed to
reduce the price of the AIDS drugs. For example, Bristol-Meyers Squibb said it would supply the
drugs at below cost to Africa. It also pledged "not to let patents to [sic] stand in the way of
access." Nigeria- Development News: Global Companies in Price War Over Aids Drugs for Afica, AFRICA
NEWS, Mar. 18, 2001. BMS Executive Vice President John McGoldrick was quoted as saying:
"We seek no profits on AIDS drugs in Africa, and we will not let our patents be an obstacle." Id.
84 See Mike Gumbel, Note, Is Article 31bis Enough? The Need to Promote Economies of Scale in the
International Compulsory licensing System, 22 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 161, 169 (2008); OXFAM
INTERNATIONAL, BRIEFING PAPER 95: PATENTS VERSUS PATIENTS: FIVE YEARS AFTER THE DOHA
DECLARATION 1 (2006), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publica
tionns/briefing-papers/patents-patients/Doha5_FinaLpaper101 106)2.pdf.
85 Doha Declaration, supra note 8, at 756 (acknowledging the issue faced by developing
countries in Paragraph 6: "WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities [of
pharmaceuticals] could face difficulties in effective[1y] us[ing] compulsory licensing under the
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The Doha Declaration confirmed that patents would not prohibit countries'
ability to use compulsory licensing to address public health needs. It also
granted countries wide discretion and great flexibility in issuing compulsory
licenses, including the grounds upon which such licenses could be issued and
the amount of remuneration given to the patentee. The Declaration also
identified a glaring weakness of TRIPS' compulsory licensing provision-the
inability of countries that lacked sufficient manufacturing capacity to take
advantage of compulsory licenses to locally manufacture generic medicines.
This was remedied a few years later with the August 30, 2003 Decision, which
led to an Amendment of Article 31: Article 31bis.86
C. THE AMENDMENT-ARTICLE 31 BIS
On December 6, 2005, the WTO Members adopted the Amendment to
Article 31.87 The Amendment enabled countries without the capacity to
manufacture generic substitutes for patented pharmaceuticals under domestic
compulsory licenses to import those substitutes from other countries that had
the capacity to do so, without risk of interference from patent holders.88 Article
31bis was intended to address the "public health problems afflicting many
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics." 8 '
D. USE OF COMPULSORY LICENSING THROUGH ARTICLE 31 OR ARTICLE 31BIS
Now armed with relatively broad powers and wide discretion to use
compulsory licenses to gain better access to essential medicines to treat public
health diseases, expectations were high for significant use of compulsory
TRIPS Agreement. We instruct the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this
problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002."); Abbott & Reichman,
supra note 8, at 929.
86 GERVAIS, supra note 73, at 395 (quoting the Doha Declaration).
87 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 932.
88 TRIPS art. 31 bir, Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 932. In particular, Article 31 (f) of the
TRIPS Agreement provided that compulsory licensing was only available in the domestic market.
TRIPS art. 31 (f). Article 31 bis allows for a waiver of Article 31(f's limitation to the domestic
market. Id. art. 31bis.
89 Doha Declaration, supra note 8, 11. Ratification of Article 31 bis is still under consideration
by many governments. See Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 929-30. Thirty-four of the 153
members of the WTO have ratified the TRIPS amendment, and two-thirds must ratify the waiver
before it becomes permanent. Press Release, World Trade Organization, Members Accepting
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licenses.90 The reality was far different. Relatively few countries have issued
compulsory licenses under Article 31, and only one country has issued a license
under Article 31 bis.91
1. Thailand's Use of CompulsoU Licensing. In 2006 and 2007, Thailand issued
compulsory licenses to produce antiretroviral drugs (ARVs), which included
Merck's efavirenz and Abbott's lopinavir/ritonavir combination, Kaletra.92
Again, in August 2010, Thailand extended compulsory licensing for the Merck
and Abbott ARVs until the expiration of their patents.'3
Thailand's action precipitated immediate retaliation. Abbott halted the
introduction of new drugs into Thailand.94 According to Abbott, "Thailand has
chosen to break patents on numerous medicines, ignoring the patent system.
As such, [Abbott] elected not to introduce new medicines there." 5 Abbott was
not alone in its retaliation. The United States responded by placing Thailand on
the Special 301 watch list of countries that fail to "provide an adequate level of
intellectual property rights protection or enforcement."96
Both Abbott's conduct and the United States' action have influenced other
developing countries to refrain from taking advantage of the compulsory
licenses for fear of retaliation by Big Pharma companies.
2. Brazil's Use of Compulsog Licensing. In 2007, Brazil also issued compulsory
licenses to produce Merck's efavirez.97 Until then, Brazil had only threatened
the use of compulsory licenses for ARVs in an effort to drive down prices.' 8
Merck had offered to lower the price, but the generic versions were significantly
cheaper.9 9 Thus, Brazil issued compulsory licenses. However, Brazil has also
90 See AVERT, AIDS, Drug Prices, and Generic Drugs, AVERT.org, http://www.avert.org/generi
c.htm (describing the expectations of compulsory licensing in offering more access to patented




94 Darren Schuettler, Angered U.S. firm Excludes Thailand from New Drugs, REUTERs, Mar. 14,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/03/14/idUSBKK277146.
95 Id.
96 Ed Silverman, US Trade Rep: Thailand on Watch List, PHARMALOT, Apr. 30, 2007, http://
www.pharmalot.com/2007/04/us-traderep-thailandon-watch. The U.S. cited the "lack of
transparency and due process" as the primary concern. Id. What sort of transparency is
necessary or should be required beyond the requirements of Article 31? And, what kind of "due
process" is expected in a compulsory licensing system? Note that neither Abbot nor the U.S.
Trade Office accused Thailand of not following the requirements of Article 31. Also, note the
efforts to retaliate against Thailand from domestic lobbying groups within the U.S.
97 AVERT, supra note 90.
98 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 951.
99 Id. at 952.
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been very successful in using compulsory licenses as leverage in price reduction
negotiations with other Pharma companies. The agreement Brazil reached with
Gilead, which cut the price of drugs in half, is such an example. 00
More recently, Brazil threatened to use cross-retaliation methods against the
United States. In March of 2010, Brazil published a list of goods and services
subject to import tariffs and other measures. 01 This list includes intellectual
property rights for pharmaceutical products;102 at least one analyst surmised that
the cross-retaliation would allow Brazil to issue compulsory licenses without
compensation. 03 To date, Brazil and the U.S. have reached an agreement on
cotton,104 but the importance of pharmaceutical patents and compulsory
licenses cannot be underestimated. Not only has Brazil used pharmaceuticals to
negotiate down drug prices, it has also used pharmaceuticals as leverage for
more favorable trade practices across the board. 05
3. Other Examples of Compulsoy Licensing Use. Since the Doha Declaration,
compulsory licenses have been issued in at least ten countries. In addition to
Brazil and Thailand, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malyasia, Indonesia,
Mozambique, Zambia, Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya, and Ecuador have also issued
licenses, taking advantage of Article 31.106 More particularly, South Africa
issued compulsory licenses in 2001 for ARVs owned by Boehringer Ingelheim
10 See http://www.pharmaceuticalsinsight.com/file/33552/brazil-gilead-agree-tenofovir-price-
cut.html; for another example of Brazil's success at cutting prices, see http://www.globalaging.
org/health/world/fakedrugs.htm. Brazil, too, has experienced backlash from its use of
compulsory licenses. In contrast to Thailand and Abbott, Merck had already registered new
patents in Brazil a year after Brazil issued the compulsory license for Efavirenz. See National
Public Radio Transcript, Bra l Health Official on Progress ofHIV Prevention, June 12, 2008, available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=91420904. Brazil, unlike Thailand, has
the size and economic strength to withstand retaliation better.
1o Camex Releases List of Products that Brajl will Overtax to Retaiate U.S. Cotton Subsidies,
BRASIL.GOV.BR (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.brasil.gov.br/news/history/2010/03-08-camex-relea
ses-list-of-products-that-brazil-will-overtax-to-retaliate-u.s.-cotton-subsidies. Cross retaliation is
authorized through a WTO Dispute Settlement Body.
102 "US Cotton" Dispute as released by the Embassy of Brazil in Washington D.C., BRAZILIAN
EMBASSY, http://www.brasilemb.org/images/content/docs/press-release/listof goods-pressf
inal.pdf.
103 Swaraj Paul Barooah, Bra#/ Set to Cross-Retaliate Against US, Spicy IP (Mar. 16, 2010),
http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2010/03/brazil-set-to-cross-retaliate-against.html.
104 Joint Communication from Brazil and the United States, United States-Subsidies on Upland
Cotton, WT/DS267/45 (Aug. 25, 2010).
105 See Current Status, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/267 (Sept. 21, 2010).
106 INDIA DEP'T OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY AND PROMOTION, DIscussION PAPER - COMPULSORY
LICENSING 3 (2010), available at http://dipp.nic.in/ipr-feedback/CL-DraftDiscussion.doc.
[Vol. 18:367388
22
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/3
TRIPS AFTER FIFTEEN YEARS
and GlaxoSmithKline. 0 7 Shortly thereafter, in 2002, Zimbabwe issued a
government use compulsory license; generics company Varichem
Pharmaceuticals produced ARVs for the country's domestic use.108 In 2004,
Malaysia and Indonesia also issued government use compulsory licenses. 0 9
That same year, Mozambique issued a compulsory license for the production of
ARVs by Pharco Mogambique Lda." 0 A few months later, Zambia followed
suit by issuing a compulsory license for the ARVs lamivudine, stavudine, and
nevirapine.111 Finally, in 2005, Eritrea and Ghana issued government use
compulsory licenses.112
4. Canada-Rwanda's Use of Compulsory Licensing under Article 31bis Waiver.
Scholars and public interest organizations had hoped that Thailand and Brazil's
issuance of compulsory licenses under Article 31 would make the political
climate more favorable for the use of Article 31bis.113 Thus far, this has not
been the case; Canada has been the only country to use an Article 31bis
compulsory license to provide generic AIDS medicine to Rwanda.114 This first
use of Article 31 bis was enabled by Doctors Without Borders, which signaled
107 ALEC VAN GELDER & PHILLIP STEVENS, INT'L POLICY NETWORK, THE COMPULSORY
LICENSE RED HERRING 5 (2010), http://www.minimalgovernment.net/media/compulsory-2010
11.pdf (arguing that changes to the compulsory license system through the WTO would be futile).
The authors argue that access to drugs has improved under the system and that resources would
be better spent in improving access to health-care generally in poor countries. Id
108 Id. See Examples of Health-Related Compulsoy Licenses, CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/recent-examples.htmll.
109 VAN GELDER & STEVENS, supra note 107, at 5.
110 Id. at 6.
"I Id.
112 Id. Kenya was an early advocate for changes to Article 31 that ultimately resulted in Article
31 bis. Ben Sihanya, Patents, Parallel Importation and CompulsoU Licensing of HIV/AIDS Drugs: The
E.xpenence of Kenja, WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/english/res-e/booksp_e/casestu
dies e/casel9_e.htm (last modified Feb. 10, 2009). In 2004, Kenya considered issuing a
compulsory license; this ultimately resulted in a voluntary license being negotiated with the brand
name manufacturer. In 2010, Ecuador issued a compulsory license to produce Abbott's
Ritonavir. The license was issued to a local distributor for Cipla, the Indian generics
manufacturer. Catherine Saes, Ecuador Grants First Compulsog License, for HIV/AIDS Drug,
INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Apr. 22, 2010, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/04/22/ecuador-
grants-first-compulsory-licence-for-hivaids-drug/. Ecuador might issue another compulsory
license in the near future as another Indian company has requested a license for Ritonavir. Id.
Since the Doha Declaration, about fifty-two countries have issued compulsory license including
the countries just mentioned. INDIA DEP'T OF INDUS. POLICY AND PROMOTION, supra note 106,
at 3.
113 See, e.g., Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 957.
114 Jerome H. Reichman, Compulsoy Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical Inventions: Evaluating the
Options, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 255.
2011] 389
23
Harris: TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Com
Published by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law, 2011
J. INTELL PROP. L
that it wanted to test the Amendment." 5 In July 2007, Rwanda submitted to
the WTO its intent to seek a foreign-produced TriAvir." 6 Canada issued a
compulsory license to Apotex two months after Rwanda's announcement." 7
By October, Canada informed the TRIPS Council of its issuance of the
compulsory license." 8 As detailed below, Canada and Rwanda's use of this
Article 31bis compulsory license did not come without significant problems.
5. India-Nepal's Proposed Use of Compulsory Licensing under Article 31bis W'aiver.
Incidentally, in 2008, Nepal also applied for a license under Article 31bis. The
Indian pharmaceutical company Natco applied for an exporter license to export
the manufactured medicines to Nepal." 9 One of the patent holders, Roche,
lobbied for the right to attend the hearing to approve the compulsory license.
When the Indian court permitted Roche to attend the hearing, Natco
postponed the hearing. Roche then sued Natco for patent infringement. Two
years later, the compulsory license application is still pending.120
6. Dyficulies of Using Article 31bis and Compulsory Licensing.
a. A Complicated Process. Since Canada and Rwanda became the first
countries to use the TRIPS Article 31 waiver, as exporting country and
importing country respectively, no other countries have used the waiver. 121 The
paltry use of a mechanism initially hailed as a potential means of saving many
lives in the developing world is disconcerting. But, a number of factors explain
this lack of use. First, the test case of Rwanda and Canada demonstrated the
difficulties in using Article 31bis.122  The process was viewed as too
cumbersome for both eligible exporting and importing countries. From the
us Holger P. Hestermeyer, Canadian-Made Drugs for Rwanda: The First Applicaon of the WTO





119 Erin M. Anderson, Unnecessary Deaths and Unnecessary Costs: Getting Patented Drugs to Patients
Most in Need, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 85, 104-05 (2009); "Secret" Compulsory License Hearings in
India for Roche's Tarceva under TRIPS Rule, PHARMA LETTER, Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.thep
harmaletter.com/file/75136/secret-compulsory-license-hearings-in-india-for-roches-tarceva-und
er-trips-rule.html; Hestermeyer, supra note 115.
120 See Anderson, supra note 119; Sumathi Chandrasheraran, Roche and Tarceva in Delphi HC
Again, This Time v. Natco, Spicy IP, Apr. 27, 2010, http://spicyipindia.blogspot.com/2010/04/ro
che-and-tarceva-in-delhi-hc-again.html.
121 Notification Under Paragraph 2(A) of the Decision of 30 August 2003 on the
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, Rwanda, IP/N/9/RWA/1 (July 19,2007).
122 Hestermeyer, supra note 115.
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perspective of Apotex, the manufacturer, the process was too complicated, with
few incentives. 123 Apotex complained that it would not use the system again:
Although Apotex announced the shipping to Rwanda, on
September 24 [2008], of seven million doses of its agent, the
CAMR's operation, criticized as cumbersome by some
commentators, seems unlikely to be copied. Elie Betito, the
generic firm's director of public affairs, said: "it took us more
than four years just to get to this point. It's a huge process, with
huge costs involved.124
Apotex confirmed that, unless the legislation is amended, it will not agree to
take part in another such deal.125 Part of the lengthy delay was the two years of
negotiations between Apotex and the patent holders.126 Apotex was also
concerned, as were other generic manufactures, that the compulsory license
issued could be limited to too short of a term, making it challenging to recover
costs for investing in the manufacture of the medicines.127
The TRIPS Council was similarly concerned about the lack of use of the
system.128 In a March 2010 Council meeting, developing countries asserted that
the limited use of the mechanism may be a sign that the Doha Declaration has
been ineffective.129 Developed countries disagreed.130 The developed countries
reasoned that other means are available to provide affordable medicines to the
impoverished in developing countries.131 These means include the use of
charitable funds to purchase needed medicines and the reduction of prices by
patent holders because of the threat of the compulsory licensing.132
The NGO sector has also been critical of the lack of use of the Amendment.
Doctors Without Borders said during the TRIPS Council's October 2010
123 Id. (citing Press Release, Apotex, Life Saving AIDS Drug for Africa Gets Final Clearance (Sept.
21, 2007)).
124 Apotex, http://www.apotex.com/global/about/press/20090514.asp.
125 TRIPs Mechanism Set to Fail as Apotex Ships ARV, PHARMA LETTER, Sept. 29, 2008, http://
www.thepharmaletter.com /file/80641 /trips-mechanism- set-to-fail-as-apotex-ships-arv.html.
126 Id.; see also Press Release, Apotex, Life Saving AIDs Drug for Africa Gets Final Clearance (Sept.
20, 2007), available at http://www.apotex.com/global/about/press/20070920.asp.
127 TRIPs Mechanism Set to Fail, supra note 125. Canada's term, for example, only lasted two
years. Id.
128 Members Ask: Is the 'Par.6" System on Intellectual Pperty and Health Working?, WORLD TRADE
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meeting that the system has become so complicated that it will remain virtually
unused until the WTO reforms the system to make it less cumbersome and
more streamlined.133
The United Nations is also concerned. Its concern is that developing and
lesser developed countries are entering into free trade agreements with more
developed countries, and are negotiating away their flexibility under the waiver
to issue compulsory licenses, particularly to produce life-saving medications for
their citizens.'3
b. Fear of Retaliation. Another explanation for the lack of use is, as
mentioned earlier, that some countries fear retaliation both from other
countries and from pharmaceutical companies. In 2007, when Thailand issued
its compulsory license under Article 31, both the United States and European
Union responded by censoring the country; 35 the United States also placed
Thailand on its "Priority Watch List."136 Pharmaceutical maker Abbott
announced it would not apply for licenses for seven of its new products in the
Thai market, including a heat-resistant form of the ARV.137 Brazil's use of
compulsory licensing was criticized by pharmaceutical companies, which
claimed that compulsory licensing would negatively affect research for new
medicines. 3 8 The predictable negative reaction by pharmaceutical companies
poses obvious worries for countries. Large pharmaceutical companies bring
jobs and investments to developing countries; developing countries are thus leery
133 Seven Years On, 'Agust 30 Decision" Has Failed to Improve Access to Medicines and Remains
Virtually Unused-I TO Must Reform the Rules, MEDECINS SAN FRONTIERES (Oct. 27, 2010),
http://www.msf.org/msf/articles/2010/10/seven-years-on-august-30-decision-has-failed-to-im
prove-access-to-medicines-and-remains-virtually-unused ---wto-must-reform-the-rules.cfm.
134 Gumisai Mutume, Health and "IntellectualProper,"AFRiCA RECOVERY (une 2001), available at
http://www.u.n.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol15no1/15no1pdf/151aids8.pdf.
135 See IVTO Must Support Access to Medidnes for Poor Countries, OxFAM EAST AsIA BLOG (an. 19,
2009), http://www.oxfamblogs.org/eastasia/?px504.
136 U.S. Trade Representative Places Thailand on Priori Watch List in Annual Report, MEDIcAL NEWS
TODAY (May 3, 2007), http://medicalnewstoday.com/articles/69507.php ("The Office of the
U.S. Trade Representative in its annual report released on Monday placed Thailand on its Priority
Watch List in part because the country recently issued compulsory licenses for several medicines,
including two antiretroviral drugs. . . .").
137 Id. See Keith Alcorn, Abbott to Withhold New Drugs from Thailand in Retaliation for Kaletra
Compulsory License, NAM AIDS MAP (Mar. 15, 2007), http://www.aidsmap.com/page/1426590/
(describing Abbott's response to Thailand's compulsory licensing of the ARV). For further detail
on the retaliations faced by Thailand as a result of its use of compulsory licensing, see Abbott &
Reichman, supra note 8, at 953-56.
138 Abbott & Reichman, supra note 8, at 953.
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of making enemies out of these companies by using the
compulsory licensing system.'39
In what might be characterized as yet another form of retaliation, developed
countries have started to increase border measures aimed at seizing
pharmaceutical products. Xavier Sueba, who recently analyzed this issue,140
confirmed the seizure of significant quantities of various drugs while in transit
in the European Community.141 Almost all of these shipments originated in
India; all of the shipments were bound for developing countries such as Brazil
and Ecuador.142 The generics manufacturers were told that their drugs were
seized because the drugs infringed both patents and "supplementary protection
certificates granted in [European Union] Member states."143 The European
Union has come under fire by NGOs for its use of customs regulations and
detention of drugs.144 As Doctors Without Borders points out, European
governments justify their actions as a way to combat the trade in life-
threatening fake drugs.145 Motivations aside, it is certain that increased border
measures are seen as retaliatory actions against developing countries seeking
access to generic drugs. Doctors Without Borders points to such border
measures as simply another form of "attack" by the European Union.146
c. Restrictions In Bilateral Agreements. Furthermore, commitments obtained
in bilateral agreements have restricted or limited the use of compulsory
licensing. The United States has entered into fourteen free trade agreements
(three FTAs with Colombia, Panama, and South Korea are awaiting approval by
Congress).147 The types of provisions contained in these bilateral agreements
limiting countries' ability to obtain generic medication under compulsory
licensees include: (1) requirements that the data generated by the patent holder
be exclusive to the patent holder; (2) prior notification to the patent owner that
its patent is the subject of the compulsory license, or prior consent by the
139 See Anderson, supra note 119, at 107-08.
140 Xavier Seuba, Border Measures Concerning Goods Allegedly Infringing Intellectual Propery Rights: The
SeiZures of Generic Medicines in Transit (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.iprs
online.org/New%202009/SeubaBorder%20Measures.pdf.
141 Id. at 1.
142 Id
143 Id
144 Europe! HANDS OFF Our Medicine, DocroRs WITHOUT BORDERS, http://www.doctorswith
outborders.org/publiccations/article.cfm?id=4790&cat=briefing-documents (discussing the tactics
by the EU).
145 See infra note 149.
146 See infra note 149 (noting that FTA and ACTA are other "attack" measures by the EU).
147 Office of the United States Trade Representative, Bilateral Trade Agreements, http://ustrad
crep.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/SectionIndex.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2011).
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patent owner; and (3) restrictions on the availability of compulsory license, such
as not allowing compulsory licenses to issue unless certain conditions are met
(e.g., national emergencies). 148
Among the agreements that could curtail the development of generic drugs
under the TRIPS waiver because of data exclusivity provisions are the Central
American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA),149 the Singapore FTA,150 the
Australia FTA,15 the Korea FTA,152 and the Oman FTA.153 And, among the
agreements that also could curtail the development of generic drugs under the
TRIPS waiver because patent owners either must consent to such licensing or
be notified of such licensing are CAFTA,154 the FTA with Jordan,1ss the FTA
with Chile,156 the FTA with Morocco, 5 7 the FTA with Bahrain,158 and the FTA
with Oman.159
The FTA with Jordan has been criticized as violating the spirit of the Doha
Agreement-which gives liberty to countries to determine the grounds on
which compulsory licenses can be granted-by limiting compulsory licenses
only to those necessary to remedy anti-competitive practices, to cases of public
noncommercial use, to cases of national urgency or other situations of extreme
urgency, and for failure to meet working requirements.160 There are similar
provisions in the FTAs with Singapore and Australia.161
148 Chuan-feng Wu, Raising the Rght to Health Concerns Within the Framework of International
Intellectual Property Law, 5 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L. & POL'Y 141, 156 (2010).
149 Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement [hereinafter
DR-CAFTA FTA], Aug. 5,2004,43 I.L.M. 514.
150 United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.1(2), May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026.
' United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement, Art. 17.9(7)(b)(iii), May 18, 2004, 43 I.L.M.
1248.
152 United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement Art. 18.9(1)(a), June 30, 2007.
153 United States-Oman Free Trade Agreement Art. 15.9(1), Jan. 19, 2006.
154 DR-CAFTA FTA, supra note 149, ch. 15.
155 United States-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Art. 1.2, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63.
156 United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Art. 17.10(b), June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1026.
157 United States-Morocco Free Trade Agreement Art. 15.10(4), June 15, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544.
15 United States-Bahrasin Free Trade Agreement Art. 14.9(4), Sept. 14, 2004, 44 I.L.M. 544.
159 U.S.-Oman FTA, supra note 153, art. 15.9(4).
160 Hamed El-Said & Mohammed El-Said, TRIPS-Plus Implications for Access to Medicines in
Developing Countries: Lessons from Jordan-United States Free Trade Agreement, 10 J. WORLD INTELL.
PROP. 438, 449 (2007).
161 See Gaelle P. Krikorian & Dorota M. Szymkowiak, Intellectual Property Rights in the Making: The
Evolution of Intellectual Propery Provisions in US Free Trade Agreements and Access to Medicine, 10 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 388, 405 (2007). In contrast, the TPA with Peru seems more in alignment
with the TRIPS waiver; the Peru TPA and the Panama TPA say that data is protected "except
where necessary to protect the public" and the agreement explicitly says both parties "may take
measures to protect public health" in accordance with the Doha Declaration. United States-
394 [Vol. 18:367
28
Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol18/iss2/3
TRIPS AFTER FIFTEEN YEARS
V. SUCCESS OR FAILURE?
A. INITIAL REACTIONS
In view of the limited use of compulsory licensing under both Article 31 and
Article 31bis, evaluating TRIPS' success based on compulsory licensing might
signify that TRIPS has in fact not been successful. Or, as Pauwelyn argues, it
might indicate that TRIPS is "more bark than bite." 62 But, it would be a
mistake to dismiss the compulsory licensing story or TRIPS as a failure.
As others have noted,163 even though the TRIPS waiver has been rarely
used, it has been used as a negotiating tool for developing countries. This in
itself is useful. Brazil is the prime example of using the threat of compulsory
licenses to secure price reductions for ARV medications. In 2010, the online
organization WikiLeaks released, among others, a cable that revealed that the
U.S. Embassy to Brazil served as a channel to relay messages to drug companies
such as Gilead Sciences, (Merck & Co. subsidiary) Merck, Sharp and Dohme,
and Abbott Laboratories that Brazil would issue compulsory licenses for
HIV/AIDS drugs unless the companies lowered their prices.164
WTO Director General Pascal Lamy has noted this use of Article 31 bis. He
has asserted that the very availability of Article 31bis, coupled with "the
changing climate among the health community and drug companies," could be
used by developing countries and NGOs to exert leverage in procuring drugs at
reduced prices.165 He further reminds us that "[t]he objective was never to issue
lots of compulsory licenses as an end in itself. The objective was and remains
Panama Trade Promotion Agreement Art. 15.10, June 28, 2007; United States-Peru Trade
Promotion Agreement Art. 16.10(2), Apr. 12, 2006. As well, the North American Free Trade
Agreement has a provision that could curtail the effectiveness of the TRIPS waiver: requiring that
compulsory licenses should be used primarily for a country's domestic market. North American
Free Trade Agreement Art. 1709(10)(f), United States-Canada-Mexico, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 (1993).
162 Pauwelyn, supra note 14.
163 See, e.g., Elizabeth Dickinson, Brazil's Pharma Pressure Campaign for Cheap HIV/AIDS Drugs,
FOREIGN POL'Y (Dec. 17, 2010), http://wikileaks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/12/17/brazils
pharma.pressure campaign-forscheap-aids-drugs.
164 But cf Gabriela Costa Chaves, Marcela Fogaga Vieira & Renata Reis, Access to Medicines and
Intellectual Property in Brarik Reflections and Strategies of Ciil Society, 8 SUR-INT'LJ. ON HUM. RTs. 163,
170 (2008). It may be the case that the negotiating technique can become less satisfactory
because Brazil saw an increase in the price of two HIV drugs despite its negotiating stance. Id.
165 Pascal Lamy, Director-General, WTO, Address to the WIPO Conference on Intellectual
Property and Public Policy Issues: Strengthening Multilateral Cooperation on IP and Public
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cheaper medicines for the poor."' 66 On this front, the mechanism has been
successful, as drug prices in the developing world have fallen and more drugs
have been delivered to the poor.
There has been resistance to the FTA restrictions. A number of countries
have balked at United States trade negotiators' desire to include restrictive
provisions in their FTAs. The issues of compulsory licensing and data
exclusivity of pharmaceutical patents have been at the center of disagreements
between Thailand and the United States over an FTA that has stagnated for
years.167 New Zealand proposed last fall-during the fourth negotiating round
of the Trans Pacific Partnership between the United States and eight Asia-
Pacific nations-that the agreement should not be "TRIPS-plus" but rather
"TRIPS-aligned," including a ban on data exclusivity provisions.168 And, unlike
free trade negotiations with Middle East countries and other parts of the world,
Latin American countries' FTAs with the United States involve intellectual
property standards that are less restrictive.'69
A final noteworthy point: encouragingly, a number of other countries have
revised their patent laws to implement Article 31bis. These include China,
Belgium, France, India, Norway, and Switzerland. Notably, none of these
countries' implementing legislation contains the noted obstacles contained in
Canada's Article 31 bis legislation.
B. UPON FURTHER REFLECTION
However, there is more that can be gleaned from the compulsory licensing
controversy. The international response to the controversy was remarkable. It
was so not only for what the international community achieved but also for
how the result was achieved. In other words, both the process and the
substance were significant. As to the process, the WTO members reached a
consensus; it was only through their coordinated efforts that they were able
eventually to produce the Declaration and then the Amendment. 70 This is
166 Id.
167 Beatrice Lindstrom, Note, Scaling Back TRIPS-Plus: An Analysis of Intellectual Propery Provisions
in Trade Agreements and Implications for Asia and the Pacific, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 917, 969
(2010).
16s Jean-Fred6ric Morin, Mulilateralizng TRIPs-Plus Agreements: Is the US Strategy a Failure?, 12 J.
WORLD INTELL. PROP. 175, 191 (2009). Lynne Taylor, New Zealand "Challenge to Big Pharma
Monopo#," PHAGiA TLMEs, Dec. 8, 2010, http://www.pharnatimes.com/Article/10-12-08/New
Zealand_'/oE2%o80%/ 9Cchallenge-to.BigPharmamonopoly%/E2%/o8Oo9D.aspx.
169 Krikorian & Szymkowiak, supra note 161, at 409.
170 Frederick M. Abbott, The WITO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection
of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 327. This is not to suggest that the process was without
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nothing short of a miracle, given the challenges involved in getting the WTO
Members to agree to what that amendment would entail.' 7' Compulsory
licensing became politically salient only shortly after TRIPS took effect and at a
time when it seemed unlikely that the parties would consider renegotiating an
agreement that took over eight years to conclude (the Uruguay Round lasted
from 1986-1994). Yet, the WTO members responded and reached a consensus
on a contentious issue.
Moreover, the fact that they were able to use the system in the manner they
did demonstrates that the system is flexible enough to permit a political process
to generate a result that was better than the status quo. The significance of
amending a WTO Agreement cannot be overstated. To date, only one WTO
Agreement has ever been amended-TRIPS Article 31.172 In view of the hard
fought gains made during the Uruguay Round, and the contentious nature of
much of the negotiations, such an achievement demonstrates that TRIPS is
responsive to change and that WTO members can indeed "recalibrate the
rules." 73 To some extent, this responds to and refutes the criticism that
TRIPS' legislative process is too cumbersome or inflexible, leading to forum
shifting.
controversy. Three issues dominated the negotiations: the scope of applicable diseases, which
countries would be eligible for the "solution," and which provisions of TRIPS would be
addressed. Id. at 327-28. Developing countries wanted the scope of diseases to remain broad,
while developed nations wanted the scope to be limited to identified diseases. Paragraph 1 of the
Doha Declaration identified "HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, and other epidemics," while
other paragraphs referred to protecting "public health." In the end, the Amendment did not
restrict the diseases for which a compulsory license could issue. Id. at 327 (citing the Doha
Declaration, supra note 8) (quotations omitted). Regarding eligibility, the Amendment provided
special treatment to the least-developed countries, and applied more complicated treatment
depending on a country's level of development. See id. at 335-38 (describing the various
situations for different stages of development). Finally, the Amendment required that Article 31,
not Article 30, be amended. Id. at 340. The Amendment applied to Article 31 (0, allowing for a
waiver of the domestic requirement for compulsory licensing, and Article 31(h), limiting the
obligation of remuneration to the patent holder to when the remuneration is paid in the exporting
country. TRIPS art. 31bis.
171 See Abbott, supra note 170, at 326-45 (describing the negotiations following the Doha
Declaration, supra note 8). Some experts believe that the Doha Declaration and the subsequent
Amendment to Article 31 may demonstrate that health care and public health concerns outweigh
standards of intellectual property protection. See, e.g., Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, PharmaceuticalPatents,
and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI.J. INT'L L. 27, 45 ("The very
fact that public health and access to medicines have been singled out .. . in TRIPS
implementation indicates that health care and health care products need to be treated differently
from other products.").
172 General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2005),
http://www.wto.org/English/tratop e/tripse/wtl641_e.htm.
173 Cf Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 4, at 188.
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The substance of the response is self-evident. The Declaration and the
Amendment made clear that compulsory licensing could be used to enhance the
supply of essential medicines to countries with limited manufacturing capacity,
and that TRIPS could address a global health crisis, while also protecting
intellectual property. Governments can use this mechanism and TRIPS'
flexibilities to lower worldwide prices for medicines, especially first-line ARVs.
This is of no small moment. As D.G. Lamy declared: "[T]he Doha Declaration
has ... helped to shape the framework for multilateral cooperation on IP and
public health through the course of this decade."174
There are other considerations that counsel against characterizing TRIPS a
failure as viewed from the perspective of compulsory licensing. The
compulsory licensing issue is not over. According to the World Health
Organization (WHO), the Article 31bis mechanism will take on greater
importance once a new generation of HIV/AIDS drugs and other essential
medicines hit the market. These second line treatments will likely be protected
by patents, unlike many of the current first line treatments, and compulsory
licensing will be necessary to ensure the availability of second-line drugs in
developing countries. 7 5
Also, Article 31bis will take on increasing importance because India-
currently supplying the developing world with generic medicines-is obligated
to adhere to TRIPS and, as such, is now granting patents on medicines.17 6
Thus, India will no longer be able to supply medicines worldwide unless it is
able to grant compulsory licenses. It will not be able to export more than half
its production without invoking Article 31bis.77 In light of these conditions,
India is currently formulating a policy on the issuance of compulsory licensing.
India's Department of Industrial Policy & Promotion (DIPP) sought comment
in 2010 on compulsory licenses in the pharmaceutical sector. 78 According to
the DIPP, the TRIPS flexibilities have been incorporated into India's 2005
174 Lamy, supra note 165.
175 Daniel Pruzin, Treaies/Patents: WHO Says Doha Exemption on Medidne May Take on Greater
Future Importance, 81 BNA PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHTJ. 26 (2010).
176 The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005. This was the third
amendment to the Patents Act of 1970. See Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round,
10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 273 (2006) (noting the modification of India's scope of
patentability for pharmaceutical inventions and India's compliance-with TRIPS).
177 See Kaitlin Mara, TRIPS Council Discusses Efficag of ACIA, Public Health Amendment, INTELL.
PROP. WATCH, Oct. 29, 2010, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2010/10/29/trips-council-disc
usses-efficacy-of-acta-public-health-amendment/.
178 India Dep't of Industrial Policy & Promotion, Discussion Paper on CompulsoU Licensing (Aug.
24, 2010), availabk at http://dipp.nic.in/.
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reform of its Patents Act,179 and the department is exploring such questions as:
(1) whether the government should formulate guidelines for the issuance of
compulsory licenses; (2) whether compulsory licenses should be confined to
public health emergencies or if licenses could be issued for drugs used in the
treatment of cancer or diabetes; (3) what the basis of royalty payments under
compulsory licenses should be; and (4) whether compulsory licenses can be
used to remedy anti-competitive practices. 80
India has another concern that implicates compulsory licensing. In the past
few years, foreign companies have been purchasing Indian pharmaceutical
companies. In the past four years alone, foreign firms have acquired six Indian
drug firms.181 This has India alarmed, due to the possibility of restricted or
limited access to medicines in the future. The concern is that the newly foreign-
owned companies will be reluctant to issue compulsory licenses and that these
companies will use current Indian marketing channels to sell more expensive
patented drugs, rather than the generic drugs currently being sold through such
channels.182 India has considered a number of responses, including immediately
issuing compulsory licenses.183 Additionally, the Indian health minister has
stated that publicly-funded Indian research organizations must stipulate-while
179 Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, Government of India, India
& World Trade OrganiZation, http://commerce.nic.in/trade/international-trade-ip-trips3.asp (last
visited Mar. 30, 2011).
180 India Dep't of Industrial Policy & Promotion, supra note 178.
181 The six companies are: Matrix Lab, Dabur Pharma, Ranbaxy Labs, Shanta Biotech, Orchid
Chemicals, and Piramal Healthcare. The total cost of the takeover is estimated at $1.58 billion.
Ranbaxy was purchased by Japan-based Daiichi Sankyo Co in June 2008; Piramal Healthcare was
bought by U.S. based Abbott Laboratories; and Dabur Pharma was acquired by German
Fresenius Kabl. See Madhur Singh, India May Issue Compulsory Licenses to Control Drg Prices, 27
BNA INT'L TRADE REP. 1349 (2010).
182 Id.
183 The health ministry instructed the commerce minister that it should consider seeking stricter
foreign direct investment (FDI) policy for the sector. Health minister Ghulam Nabi Azad said in
a letter to Commerce minister Anand Sharma.
The issue of takeover of Indian pharma companies by MNCs, is of serious
concern and needs to be tackled effectively in terms of FDI Policy for the
sector. Therefore, FDI needs to be revisited immediately and such investments
shifted from automatic to FIPB route to ensure healthy growth of
pharmaceutical industry and availability and access of our people to quality and
affordable medicines, which is so critical from the requirement of public health,
Aditi Tandon, Health Min Wants to Revisit FDI Norms in Pharma, TRIB. INDIA, Nov. 1, 2010, http://
www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20101102/biz.htm#3. The government is also considering
restricting FDI in pharmaceutical companies; currently, 100% FDI is allowed in the sector.
Another proposal will allow for patents to revert to domestic publicly funded research companies
when these companies sell or transfer such patents to Indian private companies, which then pass
into foreign hands. Singh, supra note 181.
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selling or transferring patents to private sector companies-that ownership of
patents would revert to the research organizations if the companies are taken
over by foreign firms. Some of the recent takeovers have involved Indian
companies whose patents have either been supported by the Government or
have obtained patents from Indian research organizations. 184
As a final point, it is worth noting that TRIPS has been in existence for only
fifteen years, a relatively short time as far as international treaties are concerned.
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the other two
major international intellectual property treaties, have existed for over a century
(since the 1880s). They have been subject to numerous revisions, occurring
approximately every twenty years. While there are no immediate signs that
TRIPS will be further revised, it is reasonable to assume-in light of previous
experience with international intellectual property treaties-that it is too early to
give up on TRIPS. Give it more time.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whether TRIPS thus far has been a success or failure is not clear. In its
fifteen years, its message has been mixed. While there have been many positive
developments, negotiations for further advancement have stalled. In looking at
the issue that arguably has garnered the most attention and has generated the
most controversy-compulsory licensing-we also come away with mixed
feelings. Significant progress has been made. Much more can be made.
Nonetheless, the WTO has made remarkable strides in advancing compulsory
licensing so that it is poised truly to address the needs for which it was created.
The opportunity is there. Whether we will seize it and continue a positive
TRIPS legacy remains to be seen. Let us revisit TRIPS and compulsory
licensing in another fifteen years.
114 On compulsory licensing (CL) under the Indian Patents Act, 2005, the Health Ministry has
clarified that the Controller of Patents, whenever he considers an application for CL, particularly
for public health emergencies under Section 92A of the Act, should dispose of the application on
a fast-track basis. Tandon, supra note 183.
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